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Abstract. While link prediction in networks has been a hot topic over the years,
its robustness has not been well discussed in literature. In this paper, we study the
robustness of some mainstream link prediction methods under various kinds of network
attack strategies, including the random attack (RDA), centrality based attacks (CA),
similarity based attacks (SA), and simulated annealing based attack (SAA). Through
the variation of precision, a typical evaluation index of link prediction, we find that
for the SA and SAA, a small fraction of link removals can significantly reduce the
performance of link prediction. In general, the SAA has the highest attack efficiency,
followed by the SA and then CA. Interestingly, the performance of some particular
CA strategies, such as the betweenness based attacks (BA), are even worse than the
RDA. Furthermore, we discover that a link prediction method with high performance
probably has lower attack robustness, and the vice versa.
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1. Introduction
The link prediction problem [1], originated from the area of data mining, has achieved
great progress with the booming of network science [2]. Its goal is to estimate the link
possibility of two unconnected nodes based on the available network data and tools, such
as machine learning [3, 4] and complex networks theory [5, 6]. Various link prediction
methods haven been proposed [7–10], and they can be broadly divided into three
categories: similarity-based methods (such as the common neighbors (CN) [1], Adamic-
Adar (AA) [11] and resource allocation (RA) [12] indices), maximum likelihood based
methods (such as hierarchical structure model [13] and stochastic block model [14,15]),
and probabilistic models (such as probabilistic relational model [16] and probabilistic
entity-relationship models [17]). The established link prediction methods can be widely
used in online product recommendation [18], bionetwork reconstruction [19], community
detection [20], etc.
Though tremendous efficient prediction methods emerge, their robustness has not
been seriously discussed in literature. Unfortunately, real-world networks suffer from
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random failures and various targeted attacks. For instance, it has been shown that
many scale-free networks, such as the Internet, are pretty vulnerable to degree-based
targeted attacks [21–23]. A small initial attack can trigger the large-scale cascading
failure [24–26], which is one of the main security issues in power networks. In addition,
many novel attack strategies have been proposed, including edge attacks [27, 28], path
attacks [29, 30], etc. These random or intentional disturbances significantly affect the
structure and dynamics of real-world networks [31]. In particular, the predictability of
real-world networks keeps change as the network disturbance continues. Thus, it is very
necessary to explore the robustness of link prediction under network attacks.
Recently, Zhang et al. [32] studied the robustness of several link prediction
algorithms in noisy environments. Their results showed that while different prediction
algorithms may have different attack robustness, in general they are robust to random
disturbances. However, their work has the following limitations:
(i) Only the AUC is considered in the evaluation of prediction accuracy, while the
precision is another mainstream index, which should be considered in the link prediction
problem.
(ii) The perturbation methods used are relatively simple. Only random disturbances
are considered. The robustness of link prediction under various targeted attacks needs
more attention.
In this paper, we study the robust of some typical link prediction methods under
various network attacks. Our main contributions are as follows:
(i) We investigated the link prediction robustness under the typical target attacks
including the betweenness based attacks (BA) [33] and weight based attacks (WA) [34]
and found that the WA has higher attack efficiency than the BA.
(ii) To further study the attack robustness, we proposed the similarity-based attack
strategies by considering some typical similarity indices, such as the CN, AA and RA.
Furthermore, we proposed the simulated annealing based attack (SAA) strategy.
(iii) Through simulation, we found that the SAA has the largest attack efficiency,
followed by the similarity-based strategies and then centrality-based strategies.
Furthermore, we discovered that a link prediction method with high performance
probably has lower robustness, and the vice versa.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the evaluation
metrics as well as the link prediction methods used in the paper. In Section 3, we provide
the typical attack strategies and our proposed attack strategies. Section 4 presents the
experimental results and related analysis. Finally, Section 5 is our conclusion.
2. Link prediction methods and their evaluation
We consider the structural similarity based methods of link prediction, which are popular
in the recent years [7]. In this type of methods, each unconnected node pair is given
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a similarity score according to a certain similarity index, and the node pairs of large
similarity scores have relatively large link probability. Different from Ref. [32], we use
the precision, another typical metric, to quantify the accuracy of link prediction.
2.1. Link prediction methods
We select five mainstream prediction methods, including the Common Neighbors (CN)
[1], Adamic-Adar (AA) [11], Resource Allocation (RA) [12], Local Path (LP) [35] and
Katz [36]. In the following, the degree of node x is denoted by kx, and the set of common
neighbors of nodes x and y is represented by Γ(x) ∩ Γ(y).
(i) CN: assuming the set of neighbor nodes of node x to be Γ(x), the CN index of
nodes x and y is defined as
sCNxy = |Γ(x) ∩ Γ(y)|. (1)
(ii) AA: this index accounts for the contribution of common neighbors with a
penalization term that is dependent on the logarithm of common neighbors’ degree,
sAAxy =
∑
z∈Γ(x)∩Γ(y)
1
log kz
. (2)
(iii) RA: it is originated from the resource allocation problem [37]. Suppose that node
x delivers resources to node y (they are not directly connected) through their common
neighbors. Each common neighbor gets one unit of resources from x, and then evenly
distributes the unit to all its neighbors. The similarity between x and y can be defined
as the amount of resources y receives from x,
sRAxy =
∑
z∈Γ(x)∩Γ(y)
1
kz
. (3)
(iv) LP: this index considers the contribution of paths of lengths 2 and 3, which is
defined as:
SLP = A2 + α ·A3. (4)
Where A is the adjacency matrix. The (x, y) entry of Ai is the number of paths of
length i between nodes x and y. α is a tunable parameter controlling the contribution
of paths with length 3.
(v) Katz: it takes all the paths between two nodes into account, that is
sKatzxy =
∞∑
l=1
αl · |paths<l>x,y |. (5)
Where α is a tunable parameter and |paths<l>x,y | represents the number of paths of length
l between nodes x and y.
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2.2. Evaluation metric
We assume an undirected and unweighted network G(V,E), where V is the set of nodes
and E is the set of links. In the link prediction problem, we divide E into a training
set ET and a probe set EP to evaluate the prediction method. Usually, EP consists of
10% (or 20%) links randomly extracted from E, and ET includes the remaining 90%
(or 80%) links. In ET , each unconnected node pair is given a similarity score by the
similarity index, and then all the unconnected node pairs are ranked in decreasing order
of similarity scores. The precision index for the evaluation of prediction accuracy is
defined as
precision =
m
L
. (6)
Where m is the number of desired node pairs, whose links are previously removed to
the probe set, among the top L unconnected node pairs [7].
3. Network attack strategies
Real-world networks suffer from various kinds of failures or attacks. These disturbances
should affect the predictability of networks. To explore this, we consider the
representative attack strategies, including the random attack strategy (RDA) and
centrality based attack strategies (CA) [31]. For the category of CA, we study
the betweenness based attack (BA) [33] and the weight based attack (WA) [34].
Furthermore, we propose two additional types of attack strategies: similarity based
attacks (SA) and simulated annealing attack (SAA). Note that all the attack strategies
mentioned here are for link attacks, which further means removing the targeted links.
All there strategies are described below in detail.
(1) RDA: the RDA is a very simple attack strategy, and usually works as a baseline
of other strategies. In the RDA, we randomly remove links from the network.
(2) BA: in this strategy, we use betweenness centrality [33] to evaluate the importance
of links. Then, we remove the links of the largest betweenness. The betweenness of link
e is
BCe =
∑
s,t∈V
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
. (7)
Where σ(s, t) is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t, and σ(s, t|e) is the
number of those paths that also pass through link e.
(3) WA: in this strategy, we remove the links of the largest weight. Assume the end
nodes of link e are nodes x and y, the weight of link e is given as [34]:
We = kx · ky. (8)
Where kx and ky represent the degree of nodes x and y, respectively.
(4) SA: for this category of attacks, the importance of a link is quantified as
the similarity score of its two end nodes. Then, we remove the links of the
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Table 1. The statistics of six real-world networks, where N is the number of nodes,
E is the number of links, and C is the assortativity coefficient.
USAir PB C.elegans Metabolic Jazz Email
N 332 1,222 297 453 198 1,133
E 2,126 16,714 2,148 2,025 2,742 5,451
C -0.208 -0.221 -0.163 -0.226 0.020 0.078
largest importance. The CN, RA, and AA similarity indices are used here, and the
corresponding attacks are denoted by SA-CN, SA-RA and SA-AA, respectively. Note
that the other similarity indices can also be taken into account.
(5) SAA: this strategy is based on the simulated annealing algorithm [38]. It globally
searches the best set of links, by removing which the link prediction accuracy of the
network decreases at the most. The main procedures of the algorithm are as follows.
(i) we randomly select a set of links of a fixed number from the network as the initial
solution, and set the initial maximum temperature tmax and minimum temperature tmin.
(ii) we randomly select a link from the network (except the current solution) and
another link from the current solution, and then exchange them to generate a new
solution. Let Pc (Pn) be the precision of the remaining network corresponding to the
current (new) solution.
(iii) If Pn < Pc, we replace the current solution with the new solution with probability
1, and otherwise with probability P = exp ((Pc − Pn)/tc), where tc is the current
temperature.
(iv) we update the temperature, tc = c · tc, where c is the cooling coefficient and has
range in (0, 1). If tc < tmin, the algorithm ends; otherwise, it returns to the second step.
For the SAA, we remove the optimal set of links from the network.
4. Result
We do experiments on various real-world network data downloaded from Refs. [39, 40],
including USAir (American Airlines Network), PB (Political Blog Network), C.elegans
(Nematode Neural Network), Metabolic (Nematode Metabolism Network), Jazz (Jazz
Musician Network) and Email (Email Communication Network). The statistics of these
networks are shown in Table 1. Note that we ignore the link directions and remove self-
loops in the network data. When calculating the precision, we do 100 times of training
and test set divisions and get the average value. The results of RDA and SAA are the
average of 10 independent runs.
4.1. Comparison of efficiency between different attack strategies
We first compare the efficiency of the given attack strategies in terms of link prediction.
The AA index is used as the prediction method in the experiments. The results are
Robustness of link prediction under network attacks 6
Figure 1. Precision of the AA index under various attack strategies.
shown in Fig. 1. In each panel, the first data points are corresponding to the case of no
attacks, whereas the last data points are the results that 10% of links are removed.
From this figure we can see that the SAA achieves the highest attack efficiency than
the others, since it always attacks the optimal link set to suppress the precision. The SA
is in the second place. The relative high efficiency of the SA lies in that removing the
links, whose two end nodes are structurally similar, will greatly damage the structural
similarity of the whole network, which further leads to the decrease of link predictability.
Note that the difference of efficiency between distinct SA strategies is not significant.
The CA follows the SA. For different CA strategies, the efficiency is different. For
instance, the WA is more efficient than the BA, which in some cases is even worse than
the RDA. This is a little bit surprising, because the BA strategy is shown to be very
efficient in other scenarios [27]. If a link has large betweenness, it is the intersection of
many shortest paths, controlling the connectivity and communicability of the network.
For example, link (4, 5) in Fig. 2 has the largest betweenness and is critical to the
network, since it connects two separate communities. However, nodes 4 and 5 have no
common neighbor. Thus, they have a very small connection probability according to
the rule of similarity based link prediction. Removing this kind of links (outliers) does
not affect the link predictability, and sometimes may even favor link prediction, since
these links may be kind of noise to link prediction.
For the WA, the attack efficiency of assortative networks are much larger than
the disassortative networks, which is indicated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3. Note that the
assortativity of the networks used in the experiments is given in Table 1, where positive
value means assortative network, and the vice versa.
To quantify the efficiency of an attack strategy, we further study the fraction of
links needed to be removed in order to decrease the precision by half, which is named
as attack cost and can be expressed as
Φ =
E ′
E
. (9)
Where E ′ is the number of links that need to be removed to decrease the precision by
half, and E is the total number of links in the network. based on the definition, we know
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Figure 2. An example network, in which link (4, 5) has the largest betweenness.
Figure 3. Comparison of WA and RDA in different real-world networks.
Table 2. Φ (%) of three real-world networks. If Φ > 10%, we mark it as “-”.
BA WA SA-CN SA-AA SA-RA SAA RDA
Jazz - - 6.20 6.20 6.20 5.11 -
Metabolic - 5.43 4.94 4.44 4.44 2.47 -
USAir - 7.53 5.64 5.17 5.64 5.17 -
that the smaller Φ, the larger attack efficiency. We still use the AA index as the link
prediction method. Φ of three real-world networks under different attack strategies is
given in Table 2, in which “-” means Φ > 10%. As can be seen from this table, for most
of the attack strategies, removing only a small portion of links can reduce the prediction
accuracy by half, which indicates that the influence of network attacks on link prediction
cannot be ignored. In other words, real-world networks are pretty vulnerable to network
attacks in terms of link prediction. In addition, we can clearly see the difference of the
efficiency of distinct attack strategies.
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Figure 4. Precision of different link prediction methods under the RDA attack
strategy.
Table 3. Ω (%) of link prediction methods under different real-world networks.
CN AA RA LP Katz
Jazz 12.19 12.12 15.92 11.64 12.84
Metabolic 3.78 9.63 10.64 4.62 5.81
USAir 7.91 11.54 15.68 10.21 8.11
4.2. Comparison of robustness between different prediction methods
On the other hand, we compare the robustness of different link prediction methods. To
be fair, we use the RDA as the attack strategy for all the prediction methods. The
experimental results are shown in Fig. 4. As in Fig. 1, the first data point of each curve
corresponds to the case of no attacks, and the last one is the result when 10% links are
randomly removed. From Fig. 4, we observe that the precision of all the link prediction
methods decreases as the number of removed links increases. For the considered network
data, the RA has the largest prediction accuracy, followed by the AA. The prediction
accuracy of CN, LP and Katz is relatively low and with small difference.
In order to quantify the robustness of a link prediction method against network
attacks, we propose a new index of attack robustness as follows:
Ω =
1
L
·
L∑
i=1
|precision(i ·∆m)− precision(0)|
precision(0)
. (10)
Where ∆m is a given constant, and i is a variable number and has range in [0, L].
precision(∗) is the result of precision when ∗ links are removed. Ω measures the average
decrease rate of precision under network attacks, and small Ω value means large attack
robustness.
With the given definition of attack robustness index and the results of Fig. 4, we
calculate Ω of the five considered link prediction methods, the results of which are shown
in Table 3. We can see that although the RA has the highest prediction accuracy, its Ω
value is also the largest among all the prediction methods, which indicates that the RA
has the smallest attack robustness. In contrast, the prediction accuracy of CN is not
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very prominent. However, its Ω value is smaller than the RA, which means that the CN
is more robust than RA against network attacks. These results call for a comprehensive
consideration of the performance of a link prediction method in application.
5. Conclusion
In summary, we study the robustness of link prediction methods under network attacks,
a new dimension for the evaluation of link prediction methods. Specifically, we consider
the random attacks (RDA) and centrality based attacks (CA), i.e., the betweenness and
weight based link attacks (BA and WA). Furthermore, we propose the similarity based
attacks (SA), which attack the links based on their similarity scores, and the simulated
annealing based attack (SAA).
Through the experiments, we observe that network attacks have a great impact on
the link prediction accuracy, measured by the prediction index. Generally, attacking a
small portion of links can result in a significant decrease of prediction accuracy, except
for the random and betweenness based attacks. For all the attack strategies, the SAA
has the highest attack efficiency, followed by the SA, and then CA and RDA. Note that
in the category of centrality based attacks, the BA has low attack efficiency, even worse
than the RDA.
For all the considered similarity indices, we obtain that the RA can achieve better
prediction performance than the others, but it is very vulnerable to network attacks.
On the contrary, the CN has relatively large robustness against attacks compared to
the others, although its prediction performance may be just acceptable. These results
indicate that the robustness of link prediction methods should also be considered, when
they are used in real applications.
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